Supplementary Information

A Descriptive statistics

Table A.1: Descriptive statistics

	Total			Acceptance		Rejection	
	N	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Merger acceptance (=1)	1542	.85	.36	1	0	0	0
% yes vote	1441	71.05	19.99	77.3	14.06	37.44	12.1
Relative size (% of coalition population)	1481	28.43	27.25	29.06	28.11	24.83	21.35
Relative wealth (Δ tax revenues/capita (1,000 CHF))	792	-.13	2.65	-.25	2.45	.43	3.35
log(population)	1481	6.31	1.37	6.22	1.37	6.84	1.21
Federal tax revenues/capita (1,000 CHF)	1155	.96	1.53	.91	1	1.25	2.97
% eligible voters in coalition	1169	30.97	28.19	31.77	29.03	26.58	22.60
Tax rate (% cantonal tax)	1498	117.04	44.55	116.18	42.85	121.83	52.85
Δ tax rate	1448	-1.11	14.79	-1.96	14.58	3.68	15.05
% Right-wing Populist	1479	28.98	14.33	28.87	14.64	29.61	12.45
Δ % right-wing populist	1448	7.46	7.61	7.74	7.93	5.87	5.17
% Social Democrats	1479	17.62	8.46	17.52	8.54	18.24	7.97
Δ % social democrats	1448	5.71	5.24	5.92	5.4	4.56	4.05
% population turnover	1481	14.26	5.71	14.23	5.96	14.42	4.07
Merger decision taken at town hall meeting (=1)	1464	.31	.46	.32	.47	.24	.43
Previous merger							
None	1542	.83	.38	.81	.39	.9	.3
Failed	1542	.13	.33	.14	.35	.03	.18
Succeeded	1542	.05	.22	.05	.21	.07	.25
Municipality type							
Centre	1476	.02	.15	.02	.15	.03	.16
Suburban	1476	.07	.25	.06	.23	.11	.32
High income	1476	.01	.09	.01	.09	.01	.12
Periurban	1476	.13	.34	.12	.33	.17	.37
Touristic	1476	.06	.24	.06	.24	.06	.24
Industrial/tertiary	1476	.13	.33	.13	.33	.14	.34
Rural commuter	1476	.25	.43	.25	.43	.23	.42
Agrarian-mixed	1476	.19	.39	.19	.39	.17	.38
Agrarian	1476	.15	.35	.16	.36	.08	.27
Time period							
2000-2005	1542	.22	.42	.23	.42	.18	.38
2006-2012	1542	.44	.5	.44	.5	.41	.49
2013-2020	1542	.34	.47	.32	.47	.42	.49

Continued on next page

Table A.1 – *Continued*

	Total			Acceptance		Rejection	
	N	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Canton							
Aargau	1542	.06	.23	.06	.23	.06	.24
Bern	1542	.11	.32	.11	.31	.16	.37
Fribourg	1542	.17	.37	.17	.38	.12	.33
Graubünden	1542	.12	.32	.13	.33	.06	.23
Jura	1542	.04	.21	.04	.19	.09	.29
Lucerne	1542	.04	.2	.04	.2	.05	.21
Neuchâtel	1542	.05	.21	.05	.22	.03	.17
St. Gallen	1542	.02	.14	.02	.14	.02	.13
Schaffhausen	1542	.01	.1	.01	.1	.01	.09
Solothurn	1542	.03	.16	.03	.16	.04	.19
Ticino	1542	.17	.38	.16	.37	.22	.41
Vaud	1542	.12	.33	.12	.33	.1	.3
Valais	1542	.05	.21	.05	.22	.02	.13
Zurich	1542	.02	.13	.01	.12	.03	.17

Figure A.1: Mean % yes vote

(a) by canton



(b) by municipality type



Table A.2: Random effects ANOVA

	Merger acceptance (=1)	% yes vote
Constant	2.555	71.139
	(0.215)	(1.350)
Level-1 variance (municipalities)		260.280
		(11.395)
Level-2 variance (merger coalitions)	2.377	115.942
	(0.550)	(14.621)
Intra-class correlation (merger coalitions)	0.432	0.336
	(0.056)	(0.032)
Level-3 variance (cantons)	0.135	15.750
	(0.139)	(8.736)
Intra-class correlation (cantons)	0.023	0.040
	(0.023)	(0.022)
N	1542	1441
N (merger coalitions)	443	415
N (cantons)	14	14
Log. Lik.	-601	-6242
LR χ^2	106.35	236.58
p $> \chi^2$	0.000	0.000

Note. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients obtained through -melogit- and -mixed- command in Stata. Standard errors in parentheses.

B Robustness I: Alternative operationalizations of relative wealth and relative size

B.1 Alternative relative wealth operationalization: tax rate difference

Table B.1 and Figures B.1 and B.2 show the results when relative wealth is operationalized as the difference in the tax rate of a municipality to its merger partners. The interaction effect of relative size and relative wealth in the multilevel logistic regression model (Figures B.1a and B.2a) is statistically significant with 99.9% confidence when calculating the second differences. The second difference of the effect of relative wealth on merger acceptance between +/- 1 standard deviation of relative size from the mean amounts to 0.007 ($p < 0.001$) and the second difference of relative size between +/- 1 SD of relative wealth from the mean amounts to 0.006 ($p < 0.001$).

Table B.1: Multilevel regression models: relative wealth operationalized as Δ tax rate

	Merger acceptance (=1)	% yes vote
Relative size	0.064***	0.356***
(% of coalition population)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Relative wealth	-0.091***	-0.571***
(Δ tax rate)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Relative size $\times$	0.001*	0.005***
relative wealth	(0.027)	(0.000)
N (municipalities)	1346	1283
N (merger coalitions)	385	371
N (cantons)	14	14
Log. Lik.	-429	-5373
LR χ^2	105.22	438.13
p $> \chi^2$	0.000	0.000
AIC	909	10800
BIC	1044	10940

Note. $^{+}$p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients obtained through -melogit- and -mixed- command in Stata. p-values in parentheses. Models include control variables and time period fixed effects.

Figure B.1: Effect of Δ tax rate on merger support conditional on relative size

(a) Merger acceptance (=1) **(b)** % yes vote



Note. Grey areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B.2: Effect of relative size on merger support conditional on Δ tax rate

(a) Merger acceptance (=1) **(b)** % yes vote



Note. Grey areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

B.2 Alternative relative size operationalization: % of eligible voters

Table B.2 and Figures B.3 and B.4 show the results when relative size is operationalized as the % of eligible voters a municipality accounts for in a merger coalition. The interaction effect of relative size and relative wealth in the multilevel logistic regression model (Figures B.3a and B.4) is statistically significant with 99.9% confidence when calculating the second differences. The second difference of the effect of relative wealth on merger acceptance between +/- 1 standard deviation of relative size from the mean amounts to 0.158 ($p < 0.001$) and the second difference of relative size between +/- 1 SD of relative wealth from the mean amounts to 0.014 ($p < 0.001$).

Table B.2: Multilevel regression models: relative size operationalized as % of eligible voters in coalition

	Merger acceptance (=1)	% yes vote
Relative size	0.064***	0.364***
(% of eligible voters in coalition)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Relative wealth	-1.484***	-5.992***
(Δ tax revenues/capita (1,000 CHF))	(0.000)	(0.000)
Relative size $\times$	0.021**	0.091**
relative wealth	(0.003)	(0.001)
N (municipalities)	540	511
N (merger coalitions)	193	185
N (cantons)	12	12
Log. Lik.	-196	-2170
LR χ^2	58.16	147.16
p $> \chi^2$	0.000	0.000
AIC	442	4395
BIC	549	4509

Note. $^{+}$p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients obtained through -melogit- and -mixed- command in Stata. p-values in parentheses. Models include control variables and time period fixed effects.

Figure B.3: Effect of relative wealth on merger support conditional on % eligible voters in coalition

(a) Merger acceptance (=1) **(b)** % yes vote



Note. Grey areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B.4: Effect of % eligible voters in coalition on merger support conditional on relative wealth

(a) Merger acceptance (=1) **(b)** % yes vote



Note. Grey areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

C Robustness II: alternative model specifications

C.1 Linear probability, logistic, and OLS regression models

Table C.1 show the results of three alternative estimation procedures, a multilevel linear probability model for merger acceptance, a logistic regression model with clustered standard errors for merger acceptance, as well as an OLS regression model with cluster standard errors for the % yes vote. Figures C.1 shows the interaction effects for the linear probability models, whereas Figures C.2 and C.3 show the results for the logistic and the OLS regression models. The interaction effect of relative size and relative wealth in the logistic regression model (Figures C.2a and C.3a) is statistically significant with 99% confidence when calculating the second differences. The second difference of the effect of relative wealth on merger acceptance between +/- 1 standard deviation of relative size from the mean amounts to 0.115 ($p < 0.01$) and the second difference of relative size between +/- 1 SD of relative wealth from the mean amounts to 0.011 ($p < 0.001$).

Table C.1: Robustness: Linear probability, logistic, and OLS regression model

	Merger acceptance (=1)		% yes vote
	LPM	LOG	OLS
Relative size	0.569***	0.054***	0.365***
(% of coalition population)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Relative wealth	-0.084***	-1.117**	-4.471***
(Δ tax revenues/capita (1,000 CHF))	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.000)
Relative size$\times$	0.114**	0.009	0.060***
relative wealth	(0.007)	(0.154)	(0.000)
N (municipalities)	732	732	696
N (merger coalitions)	237	237	227
N (cantons)	14	14	14
F			10.90
LR χ^2	112.27	121.79	
p $> \chi^2$	0.00	0.00	0.00
AIC	630	623	5929
BIC	755	793	6097

Note. $^{+}$p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. LPM=Linear probability model; LOG=Logistic regression model; OLS=OLS regression models. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients obtained through -mixed- (LPM) -logit- (Logit) and -regress- (OLS) command in Stata. p-values in parentheses. Models include control variables, canton-, and time period fixed effects. Standard errors for LOG and OLS are clustered by merger coalitions.

Figure C.1: Linear probability model: merger acceptance (=1)
(a) Relative wealth conditional on relative size **(b)** Relative size conditional on relative wealth



Note. Grey areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure C.2: Logit/OLS model: effect of relative wealth on merger support conditional on relative size
(a) Merger acceptance (=1) **(b)** % yes vote



Note. Grey areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure C.3: Logit/OLS model: effect of relative size on merger support conditional on relative wealth
(a) Merger acceptance (=1) **(b)** % yes vote



Note. Grey areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

C.2 Restricted sample I: municipalities involved in only 1 merger project

Table C.2 and Figures C.4 and C.5 show the results when the sample is restricted to those municipalities that voted only once on a municipal merger project between 2000 and 2020. All municipalities that previously merged/voted on a merger in this time period are thus excluded from the model. The interaction effect of relative size and relative wealth in the multilevel logistic regression model (Figures C.4a and C.5a) is statistically significant with 99.9% confidence when calculating the second differences. The second difference of the effect of relative wealth on merger acceptance between +/- 1 standard deviation of relative size from the mean amounts to 0.115 ($p < 0.001$) and the second difference of relative size between +/- 1 SD of relative wealth from the mean amounts to 0.011 ($p < 0.001$).

Table C.2: Multilevel regression models: municipalities involved in only 1 merger project

	Merger acceptance (=1)	% yes vote
Relative size	0.055***	0.350***
(% of coalition population)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Relative wealth	-1.495***	-5.338***
(Δ tax revenues/capita (1,000 CHF))	(0.000)	(0.000)
Relative size $\times$	0.013*	0.070**
relative wealth	(0.027)	(0.004)
N (municipalities)	575	541
N (merger coalitions)	200	190
N (cantons)	14	14
Log. Lik.	-246	-2302
LR χ^2	62.25	145.13
p $> \chi^2$	0.000	0.000
AIC	539	4654
BIC	644	4761

Note. $^{+}$p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients obtained through -melogit- and -mixed- command in Stata. p-values in parentheses. Models include control variables and time period fixed effects.

Figure C.4: Restricted sample (N merger votes): effect of relative wealth on merger support conditional on relative size

(a) Merger acceptance (=1) **(b)** % yes vote



Note. Grey areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure C.5: Restricted sample (N merger votes): effect of relative size on merger support conditional on relative wealth

(a) Merger acceptance (=1) **(b)** % yes vote



Note. Grey areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

C.3 Restricted sample II: merger coalitions voting on same day only

Table C.3 and Figures C.6 and C.7 show the results when the sample is restricted to those merger coalitions in which all municipalities voted on the municipal merger project on the same day. The interaction effect of relative size and relative wealth in the multilevel logistic regression model (Figures C.6a and C.7a) is statistically significant with 99.9% confidence when calculating the second differences. The second difference of the effect of relative wealth on merger acceptance between +/- 1 standard deviation of relative size from the mean amounts to 0.111 ($p < 0.001$) and the second difference of relative size between +/- 1 SD of relative wealth from the mean amounts to 0.011 ($p < 0.001$).

Table C.3: Multilevel regression models: municipalities voting on same day only

	Merger acceptance (=1)	% yes vote
Relative size	0.056***	0.351***
(% of coalition population)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Relative wealth	-1.118***	-4.825***
(Δ tax revenues/capita (1,000 CHF))	(0.000)	(0.000)
Relative size $\times$	0.009*	0.062**
relative wealth	(0.050)	(0.002)
N (municipalities)	700	673
N (merger coalitions)	225	216
N (cantons)	14	14
Log. Lik.	-276	-2838
LR χ^2	70.61	192.68
p $> \chi^2$	0.000	0.000
AIC	605	5731
BIC	723	5853

Note. $^{+}$p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients obtained through -melogit- and -mixed- command in Stata. p-values in parentheses. Models include control variables and time period fixed effects.

Figure C.6: Restricted sample (vote date): effect of relative wealth on merger support conditional on relative size

(a) Merger acceptance (=1) **(b)** % yes vote



Note. Grey areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure C.7: Restricted sample (vote date): effect of relative size on merger support conditional on relative wealth

(a) Merger acceptance (=1) **(b)** % yes vote



Note. Grey areas represent 95% confidence intervals.