Supplementary Information

A Survey and Sampling Procedure

The aim of the survey was to interview a sample of roughly 600 respondents that are representative of the general population in each of the eight metropolitan areas (see NCCR Democracy 2016: for data). Due to administrative circumstances, we had to rely on two different recruitment strategies in the four countries.

In Switzerland, a random sample of 2257 valid individual addresses of the resident population (aged 18 to 75) in the Bern and Zurich metropolitan areas could be drawn by the Swiss Statistical Office. For the field phase we relied on the Swiss Survey Institute MIS Trend. Invitation letters to fill in an online questionnaire were sent to all these individuals, together with an unconditional incentive of 10 Swiss Francs (\approx 10.12 US\$). A first reminder was sent two weeks after the initial letter, a second reminder was sent after one month to those individuals who had not replied by then. The second reminder included a paper version of the questionnaire and a prepaid return envelope. Unique links were used for each potential respondent in order to exclude multiple responses to the survey. All in all, 1162 respondents filled in the questionnaire, either online (n=936) or on paper (n=226). The response rate (calculated on the valid addresses) is 52 percent. The field phase of the survey in Switzerland lasted from mid-September 2015 to early January 2016.

In France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, respondents were recruited from online-access panels and a quota-sampling strategy was applied to mirror the distribution of core features of the basic population (i.e. residence in the center city or the surrounding area, gender, age, employment status and education level). In these three countries, the survey was fielded by the international survey institute TNS Infratest. The field phase lasted from beginning of October to end of November 2015. In this period between 606 and 667 complete interviews were conducted in each metropolitan area. Respondents were incentivized through coupons by the panel providers. Due to the quota sampling procedure used in Germany, France and the UK, response rates for these countries are not available, as the sample composition (i.e. the contacted people) changes in the course of the field phase to meet the quotas.

Table SI.A.1 presents an overview of the composition of the eight metropolitan samples and their representativeness of the respective metropolitan population before and after weighting based on the aforementioned indicators. The biggest differences between the samples and the target populations exist for education level. Highly educated individuals are over- and less educated individuals under-represented in all eight metropolitan samples. While this non-response pattern constitutes a problem, it is a common issue in population-based surveys that can be countered to a certain extent with the assignment

of weights. The weights are calculated based on the indicators shown in Table SI.A.1 with the -ipfweight- package in Stata. The largest weights are constrained to not exceed 5 and the lowest weights are constrained to be greater or equal to 0.2.

Table SI.A.1: DemGovCit-Survey: Unweighted and Weighted Sample versus Population

				,)				-											
			Bern					Zurich					Berlin				0,	Stuttgart	ţ	
	n	M	Ь	Δ_1	Δ_2	n	M	Ь	Δ_1	Δ_2	n	M	Ь	Δ_1	Δ_2	n	M	Ь	Δ_1	Δ_2
Female	47.5	51.0	51.0			43.9	49.8	49.8	5.9	0.0	48.9	49.9	49.9	1.0	0.0	48.3	49.9	49.9	1.6	0.0
Age Cohor	ts																			
<25	7.9	10.1	10.1	2.2	0.0	7.5	10.0	9.7	2.2	-0.3	9.7	8.6	8.6	2.2	0.0	8.6	10.6	10.6	8.0	0.0
25-34	16.1		19.0			16.2	20.2	20.6	4.4	0.4	23.2	18.6	18.7	-4.5	0.1	19.8	17.0	17.0	-2.8	0.0
35-44	21.8		19.3			19.5	21.2	21.6	2.1	0.4	20.7	17.9	17.9	-2.8	0.0	21.4	19.5	19.5	-1.9	0.0
45-54	19.4		20.2		'	26.0	19.6	20.2	-5.9	0.5	19.3	21.7	21.7	2.4	0.0	20.2	21.6	21.5	1.3	-0.1
55-64	19.4		17.0			15.5	14.8	15.1	-0.4	0.3	19.7	16.1	16.1	-3.6	0.0	18.6	15.7	15.7	-2.9	0.0
>€	15.1		14.4			15.0	14.2	12.8	-2.2	-1.4	9.4	15.9	15.9	6.5	0.0	10.0	15.6	15.6	5.6	0.0
Education																				
Low	7.4		13.5			7.3	15.1	15.0	7.7	-0.1	10.5	12.8	12.8	2.3	0.0	14.4	15.8	15.8	1.4	0.0
Medium	46.5		47.1			48.4	44.6	44.1	-4.3	-0.5	55.7	52.2	52.2	-3.5	0.0	50.1	51.7	51.7	1.6	0.0
High	45.9		39.5			44.2	40.3	40.9	-3.3	9.0	33.6	35.0	35.0	1.4	0.0	35.4	32.5	32.5	-2.9	0.0
Employed	74.2		72.6			9.62	73.1	72.7	-6.9	-0.4	68.9	96.0	56.0	-12.9	0.0	70.0	0.89	0.89	-2.0	0.0
Center	34.1		35.9			29.2	30.3	31.8	5.6	1.5	0.92	68.4	0.69	-7.0	9.0	25.1	23.4	23.0	-2.1	-0.4

			Paris					Lyon					London	ι			В	irmingham	am	
	n	>	Д	Δ_1	Δ_2	n	8	Д	Δ_1	Δ_2	n	>	Ъ	Δ_1	Δ_2	Ω	8	Д	Δ_1	Δ_2
Female	46.5	51.8	51.5	5.0	-0.3	52.6	51.5	51.4	-1.2	-0.1	53.9	9.09	9.09	-3.3	0.0	52.6	51.6	50.7	-1.9	6.0—
Age Cohori	ts																			
<25	7.1		13.2	6.1		10.9	15.7	15.1	4.2	9.0—	4.9	12.7	12.6	7.7	-0.1	5.5	12.8	13.6	8.1	8.0
25-34	20.7		21.2	0.5		22.0	19.6	19.8	-2.2	0.2	20.4	24.3	24.2	3.8	-0.1	18.7	18.9	18.9	0.2	0.0
35-44	21.6		20.8	8.0-		23.2	19.6	19.8	-3.4	0.2	21.9	21.0	21.1	8.0—	0.1	23.1	19.2	19.3	-3.8	0.1
45-54	20.8		18.9	-1.9		20.8	18.0	18.2	-2.6	0.2	20.0	18.4	18.3	-1.7	-0.1	20.8	18.9	19.0	-1.8	0.1
55-64	16.9		15.9	-1.0		11.7	15.6	15.7	4.0	0.1	19.4	13.3	13.3	-6.1	0.0	20.3	15.4	15.5	-4.8	0.1
>65	12.8		10.0	-2.8	-0.5	11.2	11.4	11.4	0.2	0.0	13.2	10.4	10.4	-2.8	0.0	11.4	15.0	13.6	2.2	-1.4
Education																				
Low	0.6	19.4	19.3	10.3		4.2	17.5	17.5	13.3	0.0	23.2	28.0	28.0	4.8	0.0	33.0	40.5	40.5	7.5	0.0
Medium	33.1	38.1	38.3	5.5		37.3	42.9	42.9	5.6	0.0	17.7	26.3	26.3	8.6	0.0	23.8	31.1	31.2	7.4	0.1
High	57.9	42.4	42.4	-15.5		58.5	39.5	39.5	-19.0	0.0	58.9	45.7	45.7	-13.2	0.0	43.1	28.3	28.3	-14.8	0.0
Employed	69.3	65.3	65.0	-4.8		9.89	63.8	63.8	-4.8	0.0	2.99	67.3	0.89	1.3	0.0	63.5	57.7	57.0	-6.5	-0.7
Center	18.8	20.1	20.0	1.2		28.8	28.0	29.0	0.2	1.0	33.7	24.2	24.2	-9.5	0.0	52.2	41.6	42.0	-10.2	9.0—

Note. Cell entries are percentages. U=Sample unweighted, W=Sampled weighted, P=Population, Δ_1 =Difference population-sample unweighted, Δ_2 =Difference population-sample weighted. Italics=Population-sample difference > 5 %-points.

B Question Wording

Table SI.B.1: Operationalization: Support for Metropolitan Integration

"In the [X] region, there are problems in certain realms that go beyond the boundaries of a single local authority. There are several options to deal with these problems. Please indicate to what extent you would support the following possible solutions.

A. the merger of several local authorities into larger local authority areas.

B. the cooperation of several local authorities in the corresponding problem areas.

C. handing over the corresponding tasks to a new political authority to develop uniform solutions for the whole [X] region."

[0=strongly disagree – 10=strongly agree]

Note. X=Name of the respondent's city-region.

Table SI.B.2: Operationalization: Independent Variables from Questionnaire

Variable	Question Wording
Group-based Facto	ors
Net Local At-	How attached do you feel to
tachment	a. the local authority area in which you live?
	b. the [CITYNAME] region?
	[0=no attachment at all – 10=very strong attachment; 88=DK]
Anti-Immigration Attitudes	To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?
	d. Too many immigrants just don't want to fit into [COUNTRY]'s society.
	[0=strongly disagree – 10=strongly agree; 88=DK]
TAN Party Iden-	Do you generally think of yourself as a supporter of a political party or
tification	is there some party that you feel closer to than the others?
	a. Yes
	b. No
	If a.: Which party is that?
	[No party=0, TAN party=1, Other party=2, GAL party=3]
Cognitive Factors	
News Media Use	You have indicated that you use (print $/$ online) newspapers and $/$ or magazines to obtain information about political events. Which of the
	following newspapers/magazines do you read at least once a week?
	[Local/Regional Newspaper(s) of metropolitan area: Bern=Berner
	Zeitung, Bund; Zurich=Tages-Anzeiger, Zürcher Oberländer, Zürcher
	Unterländer, Zürichsee Zeitung; Berlin=Berliner Zeitung, Berliner Morgenpost, Berliner Kurier, Tagesspiegel; Stuttgart=Stuttgarter
	Nachrichten, Stuttgarter Zeitung; Paris=Le Parisien; Lyon=Le Progrès,
	Le Dauphiné Libéré; London=London Evening Standard, City A.M.;
	Birmingham=Birmingham Mail, Birmingham Post.]

Table SI.B.2 – Continued

Variable	Question Wording
Metropolitan Political Interest	How interested are you in the politics of [FILTER1: Only people in the suburbs] [FILTER2: Only people in the centre city]
Local External	 a. [FILTER1:] the city of [CITYNAME] b. [FILTER1:] other local authorities in the [CITYNAME] region c. [FILTER2:] the local authorities in the [CITYNAME] region [1=not at all interested - 4=very interested; 88=DK] Please indicate, to what extent you agree or disagree with the following
Political Efficacy	statements. c. [Local] Politicians strive to keep in close touch with the people. d. [Local] Politicians care about what ordinary people think. [0=strongly disagree - 10=strongly agree; 88=DK]
Trust in Local	How much do you personally trust
Government	g. local government? [0=no trust at all – 10=complete trust; 88=DK]
Control Variables	
Gender	Are you
	a. Female
	b. Male
٨ ٥٠٠	c. Other
Age Education	In what year where you born? What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed?
Luucation	[ISCED-97 Codes (0=pre-primary education – 6=second stage of tertiary education)]
Income Level	Please utilize the list below. Which category applies for the total net income of your house-hold per week/month/ year? If you do not know the exact amount, please estimate. [1=lowest income bracket, 10=highest income bracket]
Homeownership	Are you a tenant or are you the owner of your apartment/house?
•	1 Tenant
	2 Owner
	3 Other
C : C :: C	88 DK
Service Satisfac-	And now a question concerning life at your current place of residence.
tion	How do you assess the following aspects of your daily life? Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements.
	a. Public transportation (Buses, Tube, Railway) is well-developed.
	b. There are enough jobs.
	c. There are enough public parks and squares to relax or meet.
	d. There are enough public schools near by.
	e. You can move freely without concern for your personal safety. [1=strongly disagree – 5=strongly agree; 88=DK]
Continued on next	page
Continued on next	e. You can move freely without concern for your personal safety. [1=strongly disagree – 5=strongly agree; 88=DK]

Table SLB.2 – Continued

Variable	Question Wording
Daily Mobility I	Please indicate how often you engage in the following activities in the city of [CITYNAME] a. Shopping b. Leisure activities (sports, cinema, theater, restaurants, etc.) c. Club/Associational activities (social or political engagement, etc.) b. Visiting friends and family e. Working [1=daily, 2=several times a week, 3=once a week, 4=once a month,
Daily Mobility II	5=less than once a month, 6=never; 88=DK] Please indicate how often you engage in the same activities outside the city of [CITYNAME], meaning in other localities in the [CITYNAME] region [FILTER: (apart from your own locality)] [FILTER: Only people in the surrounding area] a. Shopping b. Leisure activities (sports, cinema, theater, restaurants, etc.) c. Club/Associational activities (social or political engagement, etc.) b. Visiting friends and family e. Working [1=daily, 2=several times a week, 3=once a week, 4=once a month, 5=less than once a month, 6=never; 88=DK]
Duration of Residence	How long have you been living in your locality? 1. Recently moved, less than 1 year 2. 1-3 years 3. 4-10 years 4. 11-20 years 5. More than 20 years 6. Have always lived here, apart from short stays (less than 1 year) elsewhere
Residential Mobility	

C Operationalization, Measurement and Descriptive Statistics

Bern Zurich Berlin Stuttgart Lyon Paris Birmingham

Amalgamation

Inter-municipal Cooperation Metropolitan Government

Figure SI.C.1: Metropolitan Integration Support Items

Figure SI.C.2 shows parties' positions and salience on the GAL-TAN dimension based on data from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al. 2017). GAL parties are defined as those with salience>.6 and position<.2, and TAN parties as those with salience<.6 and position>.8. Additionally, I coded the German AfD and the Swiss EDU/UDF as TAN parties, since their position on political authority transfers and sovereignism is very pronounced and salient in their discourse – at least the time of the survey in 2015.




Figure SI.C.2: Political Parties' Position and Salience on the GAL-TAN Dimension

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2014 (Polk et al. 2017).

Table SI.C.1: Exploratory Factor Analysis: Commuting

N	4895
Cronbach's α	0.76
Variance (%)	56.4
Eigenvalue	2.83
Commute: Visiting Friends/Family	0.79
Commute: Club/Association	0.73
Commute: Leisure	0.83
Commute: Shopping	0.79
Commute: Working	0.58

Note. This exploratory factor analysis is based on a polychoric correlation matrix which accounts for the fact that the distribution of the five variables is right-skewed and that the variables' scale level is ordinal.

Table S1.C.2: Exploratory Factor Analysis: Service Satisfaction

Service Satisfaction: Public Transport	0.63
Service Satisfaction: Jobs	0.71
Service Satisfaction: Public Space	0.72
Service Satisfaction: Public Schools	0.74
Service Satisfaction: Safety	0.69
Eigenvalue	2.44
Variance (%)	48.8
Cronbach's $lpha$	0.73
N	4148

 Table SI.C.3:
 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max	P25	P50	P75
Support for Metropoli-	4895	0.61	0.17	0	1	0.52	0.62	0.73
tan Integration								
H_1								
Net Local Attachment	4861	0	1	-3.88	4.38	-0.57	0.25	0.25
H_2								
Anti-Immigration	4677	0	1	-2.05	1.18	-0.76	0.21	0.85
H_3								
GAL-TAN: No Party	4895	0.53	0.5	0	1	0	1	1
GAL-TAN: Other Party	4895	0.34	0.47	0	1	0	0	1
GAL-TAN: TAN Party	4895	0.09	0.29	0	1	0	0	0
GAL-TAN: GAL Party	4895	0.08	0.27	0	1	0	0	0
H_4							_	
Local Media Use $(=1)$	4895	0.4	0.49	0	1	0	0	1
Metropolitan Pol. In-	4831	0	1	-1.93	1.7	-0.72	0.49	0.49
terest								
H ₅		_						
Local EPE	4722	0	1	-1.33	2.73	-0.92	-0.11	0.7
Trust Local Govern-	4668	0	1	-2.23	1.82	-0.61	0.2	0.61
ment								
Controls				•	_	•	•	_
Gender (Female=1)	4888	0.49	0.5	0	1	0	0	1
Age: <25	4895	0.08	0.27	0	1	0	0	0
Age: 25-34	4895	0.2	0.4	0	1	0	0	0
Age: 35-44	4895	0.22	0.41	0	1	0	0	0
Age: 45-54	4895	0.21	0.41	0	1	0	0	0
Age: 55-64	4895	0.18	0.38	0	1	0	0	0
Age: ≥65	4895	0.12	0.33	0	1	0	0	0
Education: Low	4769	0.14	0.35	0	1	0	0	0
Education: Medium	4769	0.39	0.49	0	1	0	0	1
Education: High	4769	0.47	0.5	0	1	0	0	1
Homeowner $(=1)$	4853	0.47	0.5	0	1	0	0	1
Income: Low	4873	0.28	0.45	0	1	0	0	1
Income: Medium	4873	0.42	0.49	0	1	0	0	1
Income: High	4873	0.31	0.46	0	1	0	0	1
Service Satisfaction	4057	0	1	-3.47	1.71	-0.65	-0.01	0.71
Median Income	4683	0	1	-1.32	1.69	-0.98	-0.32	0.68
Unemployment Rate	4895	0	1	-2.63	4.35	-0.78	-0.06	0.67
log(Population)	4884	0	1	-3.32	1.55	-0.79	0.13	0.72
Center $(=1)$	4895	0.38	0.48	0	1	0	0	1
Commuting Frequency	4895	0.13	0.4	0	3.15	0	0	0
Residence: <1 year	4895	0.04	0.2	0	1	0	0	0
Residence: 1-3 years	4895	0.15	0.35	0	1	0	0	0
Residence: 4-10 years	4895	0.23	0.42	0	1	0	0	0
Residence: 11-20 years	4895	0.2	0.4	0	1	0	0	0

Table SI.C.3 – *Continued*

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max	P25	P50	P75
Residence: >20 years	4895	0.27	0.44	0	1	0	0	1
Residence: Whole life	4895	0.12	0.32	0	1	0	0	0
City-Region Residence $(=1)$	4895	0.18	0.38	0	1	0	0	0

Note. ^a Standardized indicators.

Table SI.C.4: Correlations: Attitudinal Variables

	Service Satis- faction	Net Local At- tachment	Anti- Immigration	Metropolitan Pol. Interest	Trust Local Government
Net Local At- tachment	0.027				
Anti- Immigration	-0.146***	-0.024			
Metropolitan Pol. Interest	0.106***	-0.064***	0.032*		
Trust Local Government	0.415***	0.038**	-0.105***	0.266***	
Local EPE	0.303***	0.017	-0.147***	0.294***	0.464***

Note. Entries are Pearson's r. *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001.

D Multilevel Regression Models

Table SI.D.1: Support for Metropolitan Integration: Random Effects ANOVA

			Le	evel-2		
	Munio	cipality	Metrop	olitan Area	Сог	intry
Constant (γ_{00})	.611	(.004)	.616	(.003)	.616	(.002)
Level-1 variance (σ^2)	.025	(.001)	.031	(.003)	.031	(.003)
Level-2 variance (au_{00})	.007	(.001)	.000	(.000)	.000	(000.)
Total Variance $(\sigma^2 + au_{00})$.031		.031		.031	
N (level-1)	3491		4005		4005	
N (level-2)	1113		8		4	
Intra-Class Correlation ^a	.224	(.032)	.000	(.000)	.000	(000.)
LR test (χ^2)	23.87		0.00		0.00	
$p>\chi^2$	0.000		1.000		1.000	

Note. a ICC= $\frac{\tau_{00}}{\sigma^2+\tau_{00}}$; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table SI.D.2: Support for Metropolitan Integration: Listwise Deleted Data

	Control	Group-Based	Cognitive	Full
Gender (Female=1)	-0.005	-0.008	-0.002	-0.004
,	(0.556)	(0.305)	(0.752)	(0.547)
Age Cohorts (B=25-34)				
<25	0.017	0.013	0.010	0.015
	(0.300)	(0.435)	(0.529)	(0.319)
35-44	-0.008	-0.010	-0.009	-0.005
	(0.460)	(0.378)	(0.336)	(0.583)
45-54	0.003	-0.006	-0.006	0.001
	(0.827)	(0.639)	(0.611)	(0.906)
55-64	0.001	-0.008	-0.006	0.001
	(0.936)	(0.495)	(0.580)	(0.944)
>=65	0.004	-0.003	-0.010	-0.001
	(0.800)	(0.853)	(0.486)	(0.960)
$Education \; (B {=} Medium)$				
Low	-0.037**	-0.040**	-0.025	-0.027
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.076)	(0.056)
High	0.029***	0.033***	0.026***	0.023**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
${\sf Income}\;({\sf B}{=}{\sf Medium})$				
Low	-0.020*	-0.020*	-0.015	-0.015
	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.080)	(0.078)
High	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.003
	(0.885)	(0.755)	(0.870)	(0.745)
Homeowner $(=1)$	0.007			-0.003
	(0.428)			(0.691)

Table SI.D.2 – Continued

	Control	Group-Based	Cognitive	Full
Service Satisfaction	0.039***			0.019***
	(0.000)			(0.000)
Median Income	-0.008			-0.010*
	(0.125)			(0.032)
Unemployment Rate	0.004			-0.001
	(0.465)			(0.922)
log(Population)	0.001			0.000
	(0.939)			(0.974)
Center $(=1)$	0.019			0.026
	(0.167)			(0.053)
Commuting Frequency	0.001			-0.010
	(0.966)			(0.352)
Residence Duration ($B=>20$ years)				
< 1 Year	-0.006			0.009
	(0.771)			(0.624)
1-3 years	0.023			0.018
	(0.073)			(0.159)
4-10 years	0.007			0.009
	(0.541)			(0.397)
11-20 years	0.012			0.008
	(0.291)			(0.413)
Whole Life	-0.013			-0.011
	(0.339)			(0.410)
City-Region Residence $(=1)$	-0.004			-0.010
	(0.660)			(0.304)
H_1				
Net Local Attachment		-0.003		-0.006
		(0.355)		(0.084)
H_2				
Anti-Immigration		0.008		0.010*
		(0.131)		(0.025)
H_3				
$GAL ext{-}TAN\ (B ext{=}No\ Party)$				
Other Party		0.025**		-0.010
		(0.006)		(0.228)
TAN Party		-0.028		-0.029
		(0.083)		(0.055)
GAL Party		0.042***		0.020
		(0.000)		(0.064)
H_4				
Local Media Use $(=1)$			0.028***	0.030***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Metropolitan Pol. Interest			0.021***	0.020***

Table SI.D.2 – Continued

	Control	Group-Based	Cognitive	Full
H ₅				
Trust Local Government			0.038***	0.033***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Local EPE			0.021***	0.021***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Metropolitan Area (B=Bern)			, ,	, ,
Zurich	-0.028	-0.020	-0.011	-0.021
	(0.083)	(0.212)	(0.475)	(0.169)
Berlin	0.009	-0.021	0.010	0.016
	(0.686)	(0.316)	(0.625)	(0.487)
Stuttgart	0.006	-0.014	0.013	0.015
	(0.666)	(0.317)	(0.323)	(0.294)
Lyon	-0.006	-0.027	0.021	0.025
	(0.723)	(0.111)	(0.183)	(0.142)
Paris	0.014	-0.015	0.025	0.036*
	(0.397)	(0.337)	(880.0)	(0.028)
London	0.014	-0.004	0.014	0.013
	(0.437)	(0.811)	(0.307)	(0.492)
Birmingham	0.026	-0.004	0.039*	0.044
	(0.238)	(0.815)	(0.021)	(0.057)
Constant	0.599***	0.622***	0.583***	0.577***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Level- 1 variance $\left(\sigma^2 ight)$	0.023***	0.023***	0.021***	0.020***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Level-2 variance (au_{00})	0.006***	0.007***	0.005***	0.005***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Total variance $(\sigma^2 + au_{00})$	0.029	0.030	.026	.025
N (Level-1)	3402	3402	3402	3402
N (Level-2)	1100	1100	1100	1100
Log. Lik.	1317.43	1247.90	1461.73	1502.62
Wald χ^2	193.98	103.71	323.31	477.97
$p>\chi^2$	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R^2	0.094	0.625	0.188	0.219
AIC	-2568.85	-2445.81	-2875.46	-2921.23
BIC	-2366.49	-2292.50	-2728.28	-2663.68

Note. *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients obtained through -mixed- command in Stata. p-values in parentheses. Random Effects ANOVA: Level-1 variance (σ^2)=.0245, Level-2 variance (τ_{00})=.0069, Total variance ($\sigma^2 + \tau_{00}$)=.0314. R²=1 - $\frac{\text{Var}_{\text{Regression Model}}}{\text{Var}_{\text{RE ANOVA}}}$.

E Robustness and Further Analyses

E.1 Mokken Scale Analysis: Support for Metropolitan Integration

In addition to the confirmatory factor analysis, I conducted a Mokken scale analysis as a robustness check (Table SI.E.1). This allows to see whether items form one scale and it indicates to what extent the items form a Likert scale, or rather to what extent agreement to one item is a necessary precondition for agreement to another. The analysis shows that the three items form one scale in all eight city-regions (Loevinger's H>.3). Moreover, inter-municipal cooperation is the preferred option of respondents in all eight metropolitan areas, whereas amalgamation and metropolitan government are less popular and the hierarchy among the two differs across metropolitan areas. The Mokken scaling thus supports the findings from the confirmatory factor analysis.


Table SI.E.1: Mokken Scaling: Amalgamation, Intermunicipal Cooperation, Metropolitan Government

Variable	Full		Metropolitan Areas						
Variable		BE	ZH	BL	ST	PA	LY	LO	ВІ
Amalgamation	.58	.69	.58	.58	.53	.56	.57	.56	.55
Intermunicipal Cooperation	.79	.86	.84	.79	.82	.72	.72	.79	.77
Metropolitan Government	.59	.51	.43	.57	.64	.56	.52	.56	.59
Loevinger's H	.42	.47	.31	.40	.37	.59	.52	.56	.57

Note. Entries are probabilities that respondent i has value of 1 on the dichotomized item; Values obtained from Mokken Scaling in Stata (-msp, pairwise-).

E.2 Anti-Immigration Attitudes and Support for Metropolitan Integration

Figure SI.E.1: Interaction of Anti-Immigration Attitudes and GAL-TAN




Note. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

E.3 Is It About *Local* Political Trust and External Political Efficacy?

One concern might be that the coefficient of local political trust and local external political efficacy just captures a general distrust or alienation from politics. In that view, the explanation would not be that citizens are extrapolating (dis)trust in local government to metropolitan integration projects but about rejecting political reform proposals altogether. If that was the case, we would expect to find equally strong links between political trust or citizens' feeling of external political efficacy towards other levels and metropolitan integration support. In Figure SI.E.2 coefficients for three different models are depicted: a model where only trust/efficacy feeling at the local level are included, a model where only trust/efficacy feeling at the national level are included and a model where both are included at the same time. We can see that the correlation of trust and efficacy perceptions with metropolitan integration support are almost equally strong in models where they are included separately. Yet, when both are included at the same time, the coefficient of national trust/efficacy feelings is substantively smaller than the one for the local counterpart. This supports the idea of the extrapolation mechanism and not a more general "political discontent" mechanism.


Figure SI.E.2: National vs Local Trust/Efficacy



E.4 Service Satisfaction and Support for Metropolitan Integration

Figure SI.E.3: Interaction of Service Satisfaction with Institutional Structures and Information

(a) Service Satisfaction \times Metro. Government (b) Service Satisfaction \times Local Media Use



Note. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

E.5 Multiple Imputation

Table SI.E.2: Support for Metropolitan Reform: Multiple Imputed Data

	Control	Group-Based	Cognitive	Full
Gender (Female=1)	-0.014*	-0.017*	-0.009	-0.012
	(0.039)	(0.013)	(0.166)	(0.055)
Age Cohorts (B=25-34)				
<25	0.011	0.010	0.010	0.013
	(0.465)	(0.472)	(0.418)	(0.336)
35-44	0.000	0.004	0.004	0.002
	(0.959)	(0.658)	(0.646)	(0.824)
45-54	0.008	0.002	0.004	0.008
	(0.484)	(0.872)	(0.713)	(0.454)
55-64	0.001	-0.005	-0.003	0.002
	(0.938)	(0.620)	(0.733)	(0.874)
>=65	0.006	0.005	-0.004	-0.000
	(0.690)	(0.714)	(0.740)	(0.989)
Education (B=Medium)				
Low	-0.029*	-0.027*	-0.015	-0.018
	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.176)	(0.115)
High	0.028***	0.028***	0.025***	0.024***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Income (B=Medium)				
Low	-0.018*	-0.019*	-0.013	-0.012
	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.074)	(880.0)
High	0.003	0.004	0.002	0.003
	(0.693)	(0.503)	(0.743)	(0.691)
Homeowner $(=1)$	0.007			-0.001
	(0.352)			(0.861)
Service Satisfaction	0.035***			0.017***
	(0.000)			(0.000)
Median Income	-0.009			-0.010*
	(0.073)			(0.038)
Unemployment Rate	-0.000			-0.003
	(0.994)			(0.559)
log(Population)	-0.002			-0.002
	(0.819)			(0.805)

Table SI.E.2 – Continued

	Control	Group-Based	Cognitive	Full
Center (=1)	0.015			0.021
	(0.264)			(0.101)
Commuting Frequency	-0.002			-0.015
	(0.897)			(0.217)
< 1 Year	-0.019			-0.003
	(0.254)			(0.838)
Residence Duration ($B=>20$ years)				
1-3 years	0.011			0.014
	(0.332)			(0.230)
4-10 years	0.002			0.008
	(0.854)			(0.424)
11-20 years	0.008			0.006
	(0.438)			(0.508)
Whole Life	-0.012			-0.008
	(0.319)			(0.494)
City-Region Residence $(=1)$	-0.001			-0.010
	(0.904)			(0.226)
H_1				
Net Local Attachment		-0.006*		-0.009**
		(0.032)		(0.002)
H_2				
Anti-Immigration		0.008		0.009*
		(0.063)		(0.016)
H_3				
GAL-TAN (B=No Party)				
Other Party		0.029***		-0.005
		(0.000)		(0.489)
TAN Party		-0.037**		-0.039**
		(0.005)		(0.002)
GAL Party		0.052***		0.026**
		(0.000)		(0.005)
H_4				
Local Media Use $(=1)$			0.028***	0.030***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Metropolitan Pol. Interest			0.019***	0.018***

Table SI.E.2 – Continued

	Control	Group-Based	Cognitive	Full
			(0.000)	(0.000)
H_5				
Trust Local Government			0.035***	0.029***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Local EPE			0.020***	0.020***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Metropolitan Area (B=Bern)				
Zurich	-0.003	0.004	0.012	0.006
	(0.822)	(0.766)	(0.402)	(0.684)
Berlin	0.014	-0.014	0.014	0.027
	(0.485)	(0.475)	(0.456)	(0.176)
Stuttgart	0.027	0.009	0.034**	0.038**
	(0.056)	(0.508)	(800.0)	(0.005)
Lyon	0.013	-0.007	0.040**	0.045**
	(0.435)	(0.681)	(800.0)	(0.005)
Paris	0.030	0.010	0.048***	0.056***
	(0.053)	(0.518)	(0.001)	(0.000)
London	0.032	0.008	0.031^{*}	0.035^{*}
	(0.059)	(0.549)	(0.019)	(0.037)
Birmingham	0.037	0.009	0.045**	0.056**
	(0.078)	(0.566)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Constant	0.581***	0.596***	0.565***	0.557***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Level- 1 variance (σ^2)	0.023***	0.024***	0.022***	0.021***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Level-2 variance (au_{00})	0.006***	0.007***	0.005***	0.005***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N (Level-1)	4672	4895	4895	4672
N (Level-2)	1255	1331	1331	1255
F	6.84	6.96	19.07	13.23
p>F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Largest FMI	0.080	0.025	0.041	0.121
Number of Imputations	30	30	30	30

Note. *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients obtained through -mixed- command in Stata. p-values in parentheses.

E.6 Multilevel vs Fixed-Effects Estimation

Figure SI.E.4: Socio-Psychological Variables





Figure SI.E.5: Control Variables



 $\it Note.$ Dots represent regression coefficients. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. In the fixed-effects model, local context indicators are dropped from the model due to multicollinearity and are therefore not shown in Figure SI.E.5b


E.7 Are the Patterns Constant Across Metropolitan Integration Support Items?

The association between explanatory variables and metropolitan integration support might be different depending on the item that captures the latent factor metropolitan integration support. This might be the case because the three items differ in terms of their multilevel character (from a purely horizontal amalgamation reform to a vertical relationship with a metropolitan government) and in terms of their limitations to local self-governance (little limitations for intermunicipal cooperation to strong limitations for amalgamations). For example, amalgamation reforms might trigger stronger reactions in terms of territorial identity, since these reforms are much more radical than intermunicipal cooperation or upscaling to a metropolitan-wide institution, given that they lead to the disappearance of at least one local jurisdiction.

Whether we find such differences across the three items can be seen in Figures SI.E.6-SI.E.10. Overall, the size and significance of the coefficients is rather similar across the three different items – further corroborating the idea that one latent dimension "metropolitan integration support" is underlying these different items. Yet, we also find some noteworthy differences. GAL partisans do not differ from non-partisans in their support for metropolitan governments and the positive relation between anti-immigration sentiments and reform is not present for intermunicipal cooperation (Figure SI.E.6). Finally, local media use is not associated with more positive attitudes towards metropolitan governments and neither is the feeling of local political efficacy positively linked to support for intermunicipal cooperation. The judgement on the five hypotheses thus remains the same as the one for the combined metropolitan integration support indicator.

With respect to the control variables, residents in larger municipalities are more supportive of upscaling tasks to a metropolitan government, but not of amalgamation or intermunicipal cooperation but people living in the center tend to be somewhat less supportive of metropolitan governments (Figure SI.E.9). Furthermore, commuters seem to be less in favor of intermunicipal cooperation (Figure SI.E.8) Finally, age seems to be negatively associated with support for upscaling tasks to a metropolitan government, whereas there is no such association with amalgamation and intermunicipal cooperation support (Figure SI.E.10). Apart from these minor differences, the results remain largely constant across the three individual items and corroborate the main findings.

Figure SI.E.6: Group-based: Individual Items



Note. Dots represent regression coefficients. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure SI.E.7: Cognitive: Individual Items





Figure SI.E.8: Mobility: Individual Items



Note. Dots represent regression coefficients. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure SI.E.9: Material Interests: Individual Items





Figure SI.E.10: Socio-Demographics: Individual Items




E.8 What Is the Role of Existing Metropolitan Governance Structures and Institutions for Metropolitan Integration Support?


A second concern for the validity of the results might be that the level of metropolitan integration support depends on existing local governance structures or other institutional features of the eight metropolitan areas (see also Table on case selection in the main paper). To rule this out, I assess whether institutional and structural characteristics of the eight metropolitan areas are associated with metropolitan integration support. Figure SI.E.11 shows two panels.

Figure SI.E.11: Metropolitan Institutional Structures

(a) Metropolitan Level



(b) Municipal Level



Note. Dots represent regression coefficients. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

Panel a shows the role of features at the metropolitan level, namely whether a

metropolitan area has a metropolitan government or not, the extent to which local governments are fragmented in a metropolitan area (a Herfindahl measure based on local government size), its national status, i.e. whether the metropolitan area is the capital region, and its global status, whether it is a "global city" (Berlin, London, Paris, Zurich) (Sassen 1991) and whether it is a "megacity" with more than 10 Mio. inhabitants (London, Paris) (Kübler and Lefèvre 2018) or not. All of these variables are included individually in multilevel regression models. None of the coefficients is statistically significant and coefficient sizes are rather small. Despite the small sample size at the metropolitan level, this suggests that metropolitan-level differences are not linked to support for metropolitan integration.

The same is true if we look at institutional features that are only relevant – or for which data is only available – for some metropolitan areas. The first two indicators (Metro Government Lyon and Metro Government Paris) capture whether a municipality is part of the jurisdiction of a metropolitan government or not. Only in Lyon and Paris the jurisdiction of the metropolitan government does not encompass the whole functional urban area as defined by Eurostat (2013) and hence opens the possibility to leverage intra-metropolitan variation. We can see that citizens living within the jurisdiction of the metropolitan government are somewhat more favorable towards metropolitan integration but this association is far from statistically significant. A third indicator captures whether respondents live in a municipality that merged since the year 2000. Municipal mergers only took place in the Bern and Berlin metropolitan area in this period and we do not see any relation between a municipality's merger experience and its residents' support for metropolitan integration. Three indicators capture the presence or number of inter-municipal cooperation arrangements in a municipality. French, German, and Swiss respondents do not differ in their metropolitan integration support depending on the presence/number of these local governance structures. Finally, for Switzerland and Germany, data is available on inter-municipal fiscal equalization payments (schemes operating at the cantonal or Länder level). Here, we can see that the higher the respective payment/capita, the more citizens support metropolitan integration – at least in the two German metropolitan areas. A one standard deviation increase in equalization payment/capita is associated with a 3.1 percentage point increase in metropolitan reform support. However, the coefficient is not significantly different from zero with 95% confidence. This is an indication that citizens might still consider material interests to a certain extent when making judgments about metropolitan integration, as poorer municipalities might benefit more from such reforms than richer ones. Overall, however,

^{1.} Paris has introduced a metropolitan government (Métropole de Grand Paris) only very recently. At the time the survey was fielded, the metropolitan government did not yet exist, but its establishment was decided already. It became operational on January 1, 2016. Therefore, it makes sense to test whether there is an anticipatory effect of the introduction of a metropolitan government on citizens' metropolitan integration support.

existing metropolitan governance structures are largely irrelevant for citizens' metropolitan integration support.

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